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IN RE TAM: TREATING TRADEMARKS AS EXPRESSIVE
SPEECH
Simon Shiao Tam first sought to register the name of his band, The
Slants, as a trademark in 2011.1 At the time, Mr. Tam was seeking to use
his band’s name to reclaim negative Asian stereotypes.2 However, the
trademark examiner found that even though Mr. Tam was seeking to
reappropriate the term, a substantial composite of people of Asian descent would find the stereotype offensive.3 So, the examiner refused to
register the mark under the disparagement provision of section 2(a) of
the Lanham Act.4 Mr. Tam appealed the examiner’s decision to the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), which upheld the examiner’s refusal to register the mark.5 Mr. Tam again appealed to the Federal
Circuit, which initially upheld the examiner’s decision and held that
precedent foreclosed Tam’s argument that section 2(a) is unconstitutional.6 After that decision, the Federal Circuit sua sponte ordered a rehearing
en banc on the question of the constitutionality of section 2(a).7
The disparagement provision of section 2(a) specifies that a trademark may not be registered on the principal register if it “consists of or
comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which
may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons living or
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute.”8 Until Tam, the Federal Circuit relied on In re
McGinley to assert the constitutionality of section 2(a).9 The court in
McGinley held that because a refusal to register a trademark does not
mean that the trademark cannot be used, section 2(a) does not violate the
First Amendment.10 Courts and the TTAB, supported by the decision in
McGinley upholding the section’s constitutionality, have rejected a variety of trademarks under section 2(a)’s disparagement provision, including:
“Redskins”; “Stop the Islamisation of America”; “The Christian Prostitute”; and “Mormon Whiskey.”11
The majority in this case held that it would be unconstitutional for
the government to refuse to register trademarks under the disparagement
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provision of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.12 The Court used strict scrutiny to evaluate section 2(a) because it viewed section 2(a) as a governmental regulation burdening private speech based on disapproval of the
message conveyed.13 The Court rejected the government’s argument that
strict scrutiny should not apply because the speech regulated is commercial speech by noting that it is the expressive aspects of the trademarks
that are regulated under 2(a), not the trademarks’ ability to act as source
identifiers.14 The majority also dismissed the argument that the restrictions of section 2(a) are viewpoint neutral, citing examples of the
same word being allowed in some trademarks while other trademarks
using the same word were barred from registration by section 2(a).15 Additionally, the Court emphasized that it does not matter whether the
speech is actually banned by noting that section 2(a) burdens speech by
denying trademark holders the significant benefits of a federal registration.16 After concluding that section 2(a) should be subject to strict scrutiny, the Court analyzed the provision under intermediate scrutiny to
show that section 2(a) would still be unconstitutional if it were regulating
commercial speech.17 Ultimately, the Court found that the government’s
only interest was in burdening speech that the government finds offensive.18 Consequentially, the Court held that the government had no legitimate interest to justify section 2(a), meaning that the provision is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.19
The concurring opinion, written by Judge O’Malley, argued that
section 2(a) is also unconstitutionally vague.20 The concurring opinion
also drove home the point that section 2(a) is often applied inconsistently, making it difficult for a trademark holder to know whether the provision will be used against a certain trademark.21 The dissenting opinion,
written by Judge Dyk also argued that section 2(a) is unconstitutional in
Mr. Tam’s case.22 However, the dissent argued that the majority should
not have held that the statute is facially unconstitutional as applied to
commercial speech.23 Two dissenting opinions, written by Judge Lourie
and Judge Reyna, argued that section 2(a) is constitutional and that the
TTAB decision should be upheld.24 Judge Lourie argued that stare decisis should be respected and the fact that section 2(a) is constitutional is
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settled law.25 Judge Reyna argued that Mr. Tam’s speech is commercial,
not the type of valuable political speech that should be protected by the
First Amendment.26
Without the Tam decision, the goals of trademark law are not met
for a small subset of trademarks—those deemed to be disparaging. At
one point, the Court outlined the two goals of trademark law, which are,
generally, to serve as source identifier so that the public knows the goods
it is getting are what it wanted and to protect trademark holders from
others using their trademarks.27 One of the major benefits of federal registration is exclusive nationwide use of a trademark where there is no
prior use of the mark by anyone else.28 Without federal registration, another band could call itself The Slants and perform in an area where Mr.
Tam’s band had not performed. If that happened, both goals of trademark
law would not be met. Because the band had the same name, consumers
could buy tickets to the performance, wrongfully assuming that they had
purchased tickets to see Mr. Tam’s band. Additionally, the band would
be able to use the trademark and would gain priority over Mr. Tam for
use of the name in that particular geographical area. That outcome is now
prevented, assuming that the TTAB does not find other grounds for refusing Mr. Tam’s registration.
The Court’s decision in Tam also serves important social goals. Social scientists have noted that many disparaging words are now being
“reclaimed” by the populations those words were once used against.29 A
2003 study noted that reclaiming words or negative stereotypes can help
both stigmatized groups and individuals to fight stereotypes and prejudice.30 This type of reappropriation is what Mr. Tam was attempting by
naming his band The Slants.31 In the original TTAB proceeding, the
board said that because a substantial subset of persons of Asian descent
would find the term offensive, it was irrelevant that Mr. Tam was attempting to reappropriate the word.32 However, with language quickly
changing and a standard as shaky as a substantial subset of affected persons, the PTO may end up hurting the progression of minority and stigmatized groups by burdening their attempts to reclaim disparaging words
and to fight prejudice.
The Tam decision is also important to artistic entities. Artistic entities, like bands, use trademark law in the same way as commercial enti25. Id. at *127 (Lourie, J. Dissenting).
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ties, but convey different messages through their trademarks. The court
rightly dismissed the argument that trademarks are purely commercial
speech. While many trademarks employed by traditional corporate entities are not expressive, artistic entities, such as The Slants, can benefit
from trademark protection and choose trademarks for expressive reasons.
Having a murky provision such as section 2(a)’s disparagement provision burdening the speech of artistic entities is clearly unconstitutional
and unproductive from a policy perspective.
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